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January 2017

Online at <https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/76419/>

MPRA Paper No. 76419, posted 26 January 2017 14:28 UTC

# Improving Climate-Change Modeling of U.S. Migration

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**Abstract:** Manmade climate change (CC) has catastrophic consequences. The United States has already experienced wholesale population realignment due to climate as households have relocated to the Sunbelt and West. The irony is that people are moving *towards* the heat and major storms associated with CC. As CC intensifies, with high rates of internal U.S. factor mobility, firms and households will likely again relocate to areas with higher utility and profits, reducing CC costs. Yet current research typically focuses on CC costs in a given location without considering this realignment. We propose several avenues to overcome such shortcomings in U.S. CC modelling.

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Understanding how adaptation and mitigation will affect how people and economic activity adjust to manmade climate change (CC) is an urgent concern. For the United States with its very high levels of internal factor mobility, migration has been a primary internal-adjustment mechanism to shocks regardless of their origin. Since Graves' (1976) seminal work, it has been known that climate and other natural factors have been a primary cause of the relocation of U.S. economic activity to the Sunbelt, certain coastal areas, and Mountain West. Thus, given the potential for major climatic changes including hurricanes, storms, droughts, flooding, as well as more frequent and longer heat waves (Melillo, Richmond, and Yohe, 2014), we expect that U.S. settlement patterns will largely realign as households and firms relocate to areas that will provide higher profits and utility. This realignment will reduce the costs of CC.

The National Climate Assessment Report states that the average U.S. temperature has increased by 1.3 -1.9° F since 1895, accelerating since 1970 due to human activity (Melillo, Richmond, and Yohe, 2014). While there was a respite after 2000, recent years have experienced the highest-recorded average global temperatures. Assuming the current path of emissions, U.S. average temperatures are predicted to rise another 8.5 -11° F, producing catastrophic results. Because firm and household migration is a key adaptive response, accurate migration predictions are needed to assess the costs of climate change as firms and households sort to locations that provide higher levels of utility and profits. Though we emphasize the United States, our points apply more generally (see Feng, Partridge, and Rembert, 2015 for a more detailed discussion).

To understand marginal benefits and costs of CC in developing policy for (say) 2099, consider that the (economic) costs of seawater rise in South Florida are not simply the lost output in Greater Miami. Instead, it is the difference between what firms would have produced in Miami without CC versus what they would produce in their most optimal location *after* CC (with

associated adaptive responses). Yet, current studies tend to *only* consider the costs of extreme heat in their current locations, using late 20<sup>th</sup> and early 21<sup>st</sup> century data (e.g., Dell, Jones, and Olken, 2014; Deryugina and Hsiang, 2014). We have other concerns with the current state of modelling migration in response to CC that we describe in what follows.

### **I. The Need for Good Theoretical Foundation in Climate-Change Modelling.**

A key shortcoming of most subnational U.S. CC studies is the lack of a theoretical model, such as the spatial equilibrium model (SEM), to underpin their analysis. In the SEM, equilibrium occurs when neither households nor firms have incentive to relocate to another location, in which household utility and firm profits are equalized across space. While it is unlikely that a regional system is ever fully in equilibrium, the SEM has proved invaluable to regional and urban economists in understanding U.S. regional growth and net-migration in response to economic shocks and long-run migration due to climate (Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2009; Partridge, 2010).

The SEM assumes that a household's indirect utility is a function of income and site-specific factors such as climate; and a firm's profit/cost function includes input costs and site-specific factors. In equilibrium, the SEM predicts that households trade off lower real income to live in "nice" places and that nice places have high land prices; whereas productive firm locations have higher land prices and wages. A key feature that determines the validity of the SEM model is the degree that households and firms are perfectly mobile to arbitrage utility and profit differentials, which appears to hold in the U.S. The SEM can easily be extended to include other factors such as introducing climate risks and associated protective investments that firms and households make to adapt to CC events (Kahn, 2015).

The SEM explains the remarkable post World War II movement of people migrating from high-income, densely-populated core areas in the Northeast and Manufacturing Belt to lower-

income, sparsely-populated areas in the Sunbelt and the Mountain and Pacific West (Partridge, 2010). Consistent with the model, as national income increased, people moved to “nice” places with better climate and scenery (natural amenities being a normal good). Such predictions run counter to those of agglomeration models such as NEG (Partridge, 2010).

These past and ongoing migration patterns are the opposite of what we would expect later in the 21<sup>st</sup> century due to CC. In the past, households moved away from hotter locations, but this was more than offset by people moving toward warmer winter climates (Rappaport, 2007; Partridge et. al., 2008). All else equal, Partridge et al. (2008) conclude that between 1950-2000, an average metropolitan county that had similar winter temperatures as Orlando would have experienced about 750 percent faster growth than a metro county with Detroit’s winter temperatures. This was partially offset by an approximate 500 percent net population loss due to the different July heat and humidity, with people avoiding heat. The outcome is that households and firms are moving to the exact locations that will experience excessive flooding and seawater rise, storms, heat waves, and long-term droughts as CC takes hold. Such migration patterns are persistent and continued into the 21<sup>st</sup> century after a short pause for the Great Recession.

Over the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the SEM model suggests that CC will increasingly induce a significant relocation of people and capital away from locations that are less desirable/productive to places with greater productivity and better amenities (Kahn, 2015). Because people and production will relocate, the effects of CC cannot simply be approximated by examining how firm productivity is affected by CC in their current locations; one also needs to assess differences between existing locations and the future locations to which firms will relocate. It is possible that by the 22<sup>nd</sup> Century, Alaska will be one of the most populated states such as contemporary Florida (FL) is today, as technological change and CC makes Alaska more hospitable. For

instance, in 1900, sultry FL's population was less than one-fourth that of temperate Iowa (IA) (i.e., 1990 pop., FL=528,542; IA=2,231,853). From 1900-2016, FL grew 3,800 percent compared to 40 percent for IA, while the U.S. grew 324 percent (2016 pop., FL = 20,612,439; IA=3,134,693). Not only does this show how location preferences can change with technological advances such as air conditioning, but also the important role of U.S. interregional migration.

The lack of a good theoretical foundation can also lead to misinterpreted empirical results such as concluding that in the future, firms and households will prefer very hot weather and other adverse weather events based on past trends. The SEM model explains why people and businesses are “voting with their feet” *toward* regions that experience many of the “adverse” environmental features associated with future CC—even as such regions are associated with *lower incomes* and *higher land prices*. Research that concludes that hot temperatures or heat waves are associated with lower income (e.g., Deryugina and Hsiang, 2014) need to be careful in interpretation because firms and households have been moving to these locations for decades. If firms lose from heat waves, why have they moved to regions that have them?

## **II. Adaptation and Non-marginal Changes Due to Climate Change.**

Migration's first-order adaptation response to CC should greatly reduce the U.S. costs of CC. Other adaptations which will also reduce costs include better cooling methods, and shifting outdoor and heat-affected work to cooler winter months (much as better summer weather historically led to higher summer employment). Future CC costs would be overstated if such adaptations are not considered (Kahn, 2015). That is, reduced-form CC forecasting models would have structural changes, possibly rendering such estimates unusable (the Lucas Critique).

Two other related empirical issues are that CC reflects a nonmarginal change and in many cases, far outside the range of past experience. Standard hedonic models are particularly

sensitive to nonmarginal changes because their theoretical underpinnings are based on marginal changes around the optimum for utility and profit maximization. Another problem of making predictions outside the range of past experience is that potentially large and catastrophic changes due to CC have unknown migration responses based on current research, and there is the distinct possibility of tipping points that will promote much larger responses. Migration responses to contemporaneous hurricanes, for example, appear to be limited. Yet, while (say) one medium-sized hurricane hitting a region once every decade may have had little migration effect, a medium or major hurricane *every year* (say) in 2075 may have much larger impacts.

To highlight these challenges, imagine building an integrated assessment model (IAM) in 1935 to forecast regional population in 2017 (with 2017 levels of modelling expertise). Such a model would likely have many flaws due to using early 20<sup>th</sup> century technological and economic parameters in its construction based on pre-1935 trends. The same issues apply in building a similar IAM in 2017 for predictions in 2099. Even as modern IAMs suffer many of the same problems, they are further compounded by trying to model nonmarginal changes in climate. Thus, we concur with Pindyck's (2013) skepticism of the value of IAMs with *ad hoc* parameters.

### **III. Finding Relevant Climate Measures for the Latter 21<sup>st</sup> Century.**

Traditional work on how U.S. interregional migration responds to climate has long used measures such as average: January and July temperatures; number of sunny days; humidity; number of "extreme" hot days such as being above 90°F; heating and cooling degree days; annual snowfall; and annual precipitation. More recent work has extended these measures to consider events such as tornadoes, hurricanes, and splitting temperatures into bins of (say) the number of days in a given year that fell between 10-15°C, 15-20°C, 20-25°C and so on (Dell, Jones, and Olken, 2014). Probably the largest contribution of the modern CC work is its

assessment of how past and contemporaneous U.S. socioeconomic and health indicators are affected by the annual numbers of extreme cold and heat days, but as noted above, the value of these results is unclear for use in parameterizing IAMs for forecasting the latter 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Current research has not yet assessed some offsetting “positive” events of CC including more temperate winters. (With adaptation, more economic activity will shift to winter). For example, while the roles of extreme heat and cold have been explored, other winter events that shut down regional economies have not. As a resident of Minneapolis can attest, it is not extreme cold that shuts down the city; it is blizzards and ice storms, which are not the same, for instance, as annual snowfall. These offsetting factors should also be explored in the future, which will require new measures of climate and weather. Better measures of the extreme weather events that will increasingly matter under CC are urgently needed, rather than deriving more complex IAMs with weak parameterization. For instance, the regional relocation of economic activity will mitigate many adverse effects of extreme temperature. But other events (e.g., prolonged rain; the intensity of hurricanes; storms; tornadoes; and landscape changes that will make areas more or less attractive) are likely to be key factors that also affect future settlement. Better methods of measuring these factors are needed for empirical work. For instance, is it the number of hurricanes or their intensity that matters? Is there a tipping point where hurricane activity acts as a migration push factor? Indeed, while people are drawn today to areas with severe droughts in the Desert Southwest because of its link to sunny weather, there is likely a tipping point such as the Dustbowl (Hornbeck, 2012) where drought conditions repel people.

In sum, while better climate measures would improve analysis, the climate factors that will drive *future* migration are unknown, much as the appeal of warm winters was unknown in 1935.

#### **IV. Other Migration Issues.**



Other “known unknowns” will also affect future migration. For one, the pace of future productivity and income growth, as well as innovations in adaptation, will affect whether actors have the resources to take precautionary actions such as relocating or taking other precautions to stay. While future migration will likely be a first-order driver of U.S. adaptation, we now lack key knowledge that would help us forecast its role decades in advance. Similarly, CC costs will be higher if the post-2000 decline in migration responses to economic shocks remains permanent (Partridge et al., 2012). (Yet migration responses to amenities are mostly unchanged.) Thus, more research is needed to understand whether declining migration rates are permanent.

### **V. Other Future Research Needs.**

There are other institutional features that will affect future migration and CC costs. Probably the most prominent is how the different levels of government support affected areas by constructing infrastructure such as large seawalls. Such expenditures promote moral hazard, slowing needed adjustment and increasing CC costs. Likewise, state and local officials in what will be the most impacted areas have near- and medium-term incentives to promote economic development, including providing favorable land-use policy for residential and commercial development and building infrastructure. Not only are such expenditures potentially wasteful, they encourage more households and firms to locate in these areas, further increasing future CC costs. It is easy to see why today’s policymakers could place little weight on CC. For example, if using a private discount rate of 5 percent, one dollar in 50 years is worth only 8 cents today.

These issues point to urgent research need to identify institutional features in a federal system that will aid adjustment processes under adverse environmental changes. How can the federal government, for instance, properly support state and local governments while minimizing moral hazard? Also, how can state and local government incentives be tailored to internalize

future costs of their actions in order to avoid attracting activity to areas that will be most adversely affected? More research is also needed to investigate the roles of the rural-urban divide and of rising income inequality in not only affecting the ability of lower-income households to take adaptive steps, but also whether these corrode key institutions.

## **VI. Conclusion.**

Manmade CC poses dire risks to the planet. This paper assesses the role of migration in the U.S. adaptation process. In most CC work, interregional migration has typically been treated as second-order or less. Yet, with high interregional capital and labor mobility, migration should be a primary adaptation mechanism as households and firms relocate to their preferred location, much as U.S. population realigned from the Northeast and Manufacturing Belt to the Sunbelt and western states after World War II. We paint a guardedly optimistic picture in which Alaska and other northern states could gain economic activity. Yet, this picture only applies to large countries with sizeable climate variability, along with high internal factor mobility. Canada, China, and the United States are among the few countries that appear to fit these criteria.

Current U.S. CC research, however, tends to examine how socioeconomic indicators were affected by extreme heat in the late 20th century and early 21<sup>st</sup> century. Besides reflecting virtually none of the adaptations that will occur, they miss the actual economic costs of CC. Particularly, they do not consider the future difference in economic activity between places where economic activity would have occurred without CC and places where actors relocated as a result of CC. Given current knowledge, we believe there is little value of current U.S. based CC change cost predictions given the paucity of knowledge on how migration will adjust.

Instead of developing more complex IAMs that are poorly parameterized (Pindyck, 2013), we propose that current research focus on developing a better understanding of migration's first-

order role in CC adaptation. Our first suggestion is that rather than start estimating reduced-form models using past data, researchers should adopt a theoretical framework such as the SEM and better recognize the Lucas Critique that reduced-form parameters change as structural factors change. Second, more research is needed in developing climate measures that better reflect the future features of CC such as number and intensity of storms, heavy rainfall events, (fewer) blizzards and (fewer) ice storms. We feel that future internal migration can greatly limit the costs of extreme heat, but the effects of the other factors are largely unknown. Third, research should focus on identifying better institutions, improving local resilience, and reducing moral hazard.

Even if our guardedly optimistic view is correct, this does not mean the U.S. should ignore CC. Steps to properly price carbon and other actions are needed to avoid a catastrophe and to support U.S. trading partners. Even if the U.S. economy suffers little, CC will greatly degrade stunning locations with high option values such as South Florida. Finally, as a major historic contributor to CC, the U.S. is obligated to help vulnerable countries.

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